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

THE GUARD & RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE

THE GUARD & RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE

The "Total Force" includes all the resources available to perform the various national defense missions. It includes U.S. Active and Reserve (National Guard and Reserve) component forces, civilians, and—in planning for contingency operations—appropriate forces of our allies. Total Force planning is not new for the United States. Planning to make the Reservee components a useful part of the Total Force is as old as the Republic.

Total Force Success

The Total Force Policy has had significant success in recent years in shaping American military forces. Further progress in the area of the Reserves will continue to require that:

- It be recognized that the needs of deterrence, peacetime presence, and immediate response, demand that major portions of the force be Active.
- Essential missions must be identified within the capabilities of the Reserves and within the constraints of the Secretary of Defense planning guidance.
- These missions be assigned to the Reserves, and good performance demanded. If there is doubt about the Reserves' capability to perform a mission, that capability should be tested before the mission is assigned.
- The Reserves be provided with modern equipment, and a reasonable balance be achieved between the Reserve structure and its equipment so that no forces are maintained for which there is no useful equipment, and no equipment is maintained for which there are no useful forces.
- Greater responsibility be placed on the Active forces for improving training of the Reserves.
- The planning and management of Active and Reserve component forces be integrated into a coherent whole.

The Total Force Policy was supported in the fiscal year (FY) 76-80 five-year Defense program, on which the Defense portion of the FY 76 President's budget is based. The FY 77-81 Total Force Program guidance of the Secretary of Defense will assure further progress toward the Total Force goal.

President's Budget Actions

The Army will add three Active divisions, for a total of 16 Active and eight Reserve divisions. This is being done with no increase in manpower, through support reductions in the Active force and through use of Reserve brigades as organic elements of some of the new divisions.

The Army's program of affiliation of Reserve units with active divisions has been expanded from 36 battalions in FY 75 to a program of 89 battalions in FY 76. Sixty battalions are in the roundout/ augmentation maneuver elements; the remainder are engineer, artillery, airborne, signal, and special forces battalions.

The Army has programmed an increase in production of M60 series tanks and the retrofit of 1,200 older M48 series tanks to the M48A5 configuration—including a diesel engine, a 105mm gun, and a fire control system essentially identical to that on the M60 tank. This will allow equipping all Active and Reserve tank battalions with modern (M48A5 or better) tanks, including maintenance and combat consumption stocks, by FY81, assuming no unexpected increase in tank exports.

The production of antitank guided missile systems will provide for equipping of all Active and Reserve infantry battalions with Tube-Launched, optically tracked, wire-guided [missiles] (TOW) by FY 80.

The rate of introduction into the Navy Reserves of the newer and more capable P-3 long-range Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft is being accelerated coincident with the phase-out of the older SP-2Hs. By FY 80 the Reserves will be equipped with all P-3A/B aircraft.

In the area of Navy Reserve light attack aircraft forces, there will be a shift from A-4 to all A-7A/B by FY 78. Introduction of the newer A-7E is planned to start in FY 80.

The five-year DoD program is dynamic, and selected elements will change from time to time as the situation changes, or as the Congress provides additional guidance. Thus the FY 77 budget may not fully execute every one of the planned actions described in this report.

The Reserve airborne early warning aircraft are to be upgraded from the E-1B to the E-2B in FY 77.

Individual Naval Reservists will be assigned directly to specific billets on some active surface combatants. A pilot program involving five ships to be manned with 80 percent Active and 20 percent Reservists is planned for FY 76. These ships will not routinely forward deploy. If this test proves successful, the program will be extended to any surface combatant ships not required to provide a peacetime rotation base for forward deployed units.

In order to improve the use of airlift assets, most DoD airlift forces are being consolidated under the Air Force. This will lead to elimination of the old C-118 transport squadrons in the Naval Reserve by the end of FY 77. In other actions, the four remaining old S-2 fixed wing carrier-based ASW squadrons will be eliminated from the force in FY 76, and four Reserve SH-3 helicopter ASW squadrons will be converted to the SH-3H configuration in FY 78-80. Two Reserve light attack helicopter squadrons, of seven HH-1K helicopters each, are programmed to be formed in FY 77 to support Reserve special warfare

The Army has programmed an increase in production of M60 series tanks. This will allow equipping all Active and Reserve tank battalions with modern equipment.

Seabees of a Naval mobile construction battalion run a centerline for a road being built at an ammunition supply point. The President's budget proposes to reduce Reserve Seabee battalions from 17 to 8 by the end of FY 76.

forces. A new quick-response combat search and rescue (SAR) squadron of six HH-3A helicopters is being added to the Naval Reserve in FY 76.

Nine aging and minimally capable coastal minesweeping ships in the FY 75 force were dropped on June 30, 1975, leaving the 22 ocean eight patrol gunboats—coastal patrol and naval inshore warfare craft employed successfully in Vietnam—will be added to the Reserves during FY 76. Two amphibious transports (LPAs) and one amphibious cargo ship (LKA) are programmed to transfer to the Reserves in FY 76. These ships average 20 years of age, and have about 10 years of useful service life remaining. The number of Reserve surface combatants will be reduced from the FY 75 level of 34 to 30 during the period FY 76-80. In FY 80, two fast frigates will be transferred to the Reserves.

The President's Budget proposed to reduce Reserve Seabee battalions from 17 to 8 by the end of FY 76. The FY 76-80 program level of 8 Active and 8 Reserve Seabee battalions will support some combination of Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) requiring three battalions each, and fleet construction requirements. The actual allocation of Seabee battalions to MAF and fleet support will depend upon actual priorities which develop. Additional construction capability required for long-term projects in a major conflict will be provided from assets within the civilian construction industry.

The President's Budget proposed to reduce Naval Reserve paid drill strength from 113,000 to 92,000. The largest part of this reduction (13,700 spaces) is a result of management streamlining and headquarters reviews, which will allow reductions in or elimination of numerous base support personnel, operational staff groups, special and general support units, and surface divisions. The reduction in Seabee battalions accounts for 5,300 spaces.

In the Marine Corps' aircraft modernization program, F-4 aircraft will replace F-8s in one Reserve squadron, and one Reserve squadron will receive KC-130 tankers to replace C-119 airlift aircraft.

The Air Force will shift 32 KC-135 tankers to the Reserve components in 1976, and has programmed to transfer a total of 128 by FY 79. The Reserve components thus are placed squarely in the strategic offensive mission for the first time.

The Air Force in FY 76-78 will expand its program under which an Air Force Reserve associate squadron is collocated with each of the 17 active strategic airlift (C-5/C-141) squadrons. Personnel in these Reserve squadrons fly and maintain the same aircraft used by the Active squadrons, and, when mobilized, provide for significantly increased aircraft use and airlift capability. Reserve crews will increase from their FY 76 levels of 1.25 and 1.50 Reserve crews/aircraft for the C-5 and C-141, respectively, to 1.75 and 2.0 by FY 78.

The Air Force will provide 125 modern A-7 aircraft to the Reserve components by FY 76, and plans to add more A-7s, F-4s, and new A-10s by FY 80.

The Reserves, through aircraft changes, will be further modernized through the addition of four RF-4 reconnaissance squadrons, one C-130 tactical airlift squadron, and one AC-130 special operations squadron in FY 76.

Total Force Program Guidance

The Secretary of Defense reviewed the Total Force Study recommendations with representatives of the Military Departments and with the Joint Chiefs to Staff. As a result he made a number of program decisions to guide DoD in preparing the FY 77 budget and the FY 77-81 Five-Year Defense

Program. This program guidance is described in the following paragraphs.

Manpower required in peacetime for the Department of Defense must be based on projected wartime needs, peacetime commitments in support of national policy, and peacetime command and training requirements. There are five echelons of military manpower available to meet mobilization and wartime requirements. (In addition, civilian employees of DoD would continue to work in wartime, and more people could be hired from the civilian population after mobilization.)

Chart one illustrates the echelons of military manpower by projected FY 80 strength, and summarizes how people enter the different echelons, under what authority they may be called up, and the estimated yield upon mobilization (fraction of population answering call up).

The Active Military Manpower category consists of full time military personnel who have enlisted for a specific term of service of three to six years (Some now serve who enlisted for two years under an option no longer available), with a statutory total military obligation, including reserve status, of six years. The most common Army enlistment is for three years of active duty followed by three years of Reserve obligation. The Navy and Air Force typically have four-year initial enlistments, followed by two years of Reserve obligation. Between 15 and 20 percent of those who enlist, reenlist for a period of service beyond their initial active duty period. The FY 80 active military force is programmed to consist of about 2.1 million uniformed personnel.

The Ready Reserve comprises both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. Its size is limited by law to 2.9 million individuals. Up to one million Ready Reservists may be ordered to active duty without their consent for 24 months upon a Presidential declaration of national emergency. The one million man/24 month limitations do not apply in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress.

The Selected Reserve consists mainly of individuals in units who have enlisted in the Guard or Reserve, and who have served on active duty. Others in the Selected Reserve are fulfilling their obligation to serve in a Selected Reserve unit for from one to three years following an initial active duty obligation. Most Selected Reservists attend 48 drills and two weeks of annual training each year. This typically means the Reservist drills one weekend each month, for which he is credited with four drills, and is paid for four days. Some attend fewer than 48 drills. Most Selected Reservists serve in units. The FY 80 program includes nearly 900,000 Selected Reservists.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a pool of individuals who have recently served in the Active forces or Selected Reserve and who have some period of obligation service remaining under their enlistment contract. The period to be spent in the IRR ranges from one to three years. Most do not train, although about 10,000 Army

Chart 1

ECHELONS OF AVAILABLE MILITARY MANPOWER

(PROJECTED FY 80 STRENGTH (000))



	ACTIVE	SEL. RES	IRR	STBY RES	RET. PERS
Entry:	Volunteer	Volunteer (most follow some active service)	Most after 2-4 years active service (some from Sel. Res.)	Most in last year of 6-year obligation, some temporarily unavailable	Retire from other categories
Call up Authority	—	Presidential declaration of national emergency (up to 1 Million for up to 2 years) Congressional declaration of war or national emergency (no limit)		Cong decl of war or natl emerg Director of Selective Service must determine availability	Ret Res like Stby Retired Regs. - Pres Order (A, AF, CG) - War or Pres decl of natl emerg(N, MC)
Estimated Yield					
Past Experience	100%	90%	60%	No Experience	
Used in Total Force Study	100%	95%	70%	50%	10%

IRRs are expected to attend two-week annual training this year. The IRR is projected to decrease from its present 681,000 men to 526,000 by FY 80. The Army share is projected to decrease from about 400,000 to 288,000.

The Standby Reserve group consists of individuals who have served on active duty and who have some service, usually one year or less, remaining under their six-year obligation. There is no legal limitation to the size of the Standby Reserve. Most Standby Reservists do not train. The Standby Reserve may be called to active duty in the event a war or national emergency is declared by Congress, but no Standby Reservist may be ordered to active duty until the Director of Selective Service determines that he is available for duty. The Standby Reserve will drop from its present level of 381,000 to 311,000 by FY 80.

Retired personnel are individuals in a nondisability retired status from either Reserve or Active service. They do not train, but may be called to active duty by Presidential Order (retired Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard Regulars), Presidential declaration of national emergency (retired Navy and Marine Corps Regulars), or by Congressional declaration of national emergency (retired Reservists). Retired personnel will number 891,000 in FY 76, and increase to 986,000 by FY 80.

In addition to the five echelons of military manpower available, there will be two other sources available after mobilization. First, civilians may be appointed directly to military positions. These consist mainly of people with professional qualifications (e.g., doctors, lawyers). The final source is civilians who enlist or are drafted into service. Those without prior military service (a majority) may not by law be deployed overseas until they have served 120 days of active military service. All accessions today are volunteers. In time of national emergency, it is assumed that the President would request legislation to activate the standby draft.

The different echelons have different costs, and even within an echelon, costs will differ depending on training participation of the Reservist. Chart 2 illustrates the different possible costs, as a function of echelon and training participation (retirement costs not included).

A comparison of available manpower with the mobilization requirement shows that except for the Army there will be sufficient assets. The major problem is meeting the Army's requirement for more than 300,000 trained individuals shortly after mobilization, prior to the time that new personnel could be selected and trained. Under the present system, the Army would be short about 150,000 enlisted members, although there would be more than enough officers. The enlisted shortfall is heaviest in the combat skills, where the casualties are greatest. This potential enlisted manpower crisis for the early months of a major war requires remedial action starting now.

Individual Reservists would be drawn primarily from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) pool. Because the pool is based mainly on a residual military obligation following active duty, an increase in the length of the total military obligation would increase the pool size.

Current law provides for transfer of an individual upon request to the Standby Reserve after five years of service. Essentially everyone eligible is transferred. Elimination of this provision would increase the IRR pool by about 13,000 officers and 107,000 enlisted

Chart 2

ANNUAL COST OF A MAN BY ECHELON*

(Participation: Annual Drill Days/Days of Summer Training)



*Includes pay and operations/maintenance, based on Army average.

members. The same number would be gained for each one-year increase in military obligation. With no Standby provision, an eight-year obligation would be required to meet the Army's enlisted needs.

To cover potential skill mismatches and to allow for expanded planning for use of the IRR, a military obligation period through age 28 (which is about 10 years of obligation for the average enlisted member) would provide about the same number of people without having people older than desirable in the combat ranks.

Legislation would be required to change the statutory period of military obligation. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense has decided to seek legislation providing for people entering military service to have a Ready Reserve obligation through age 28, and eliminating the option that after five years Reservists can be transferred to the Standby Reserve upon request. To allow closer management of the IRR, the proposed legislation would require each member of the IRR to keep his Service notified of any change in address, job, or physical condition.

This lengthening of the total period of military obligation would have minimal impact on the individual. Aside from keeping his Service informed he would have no other military obligation except in the event of a national crisis involving a major mobilization.

While the Army and Marine Corps mobilization systems are designed around the use of IRRs to flesh out their force structures on M-Day, the Navy (except for the shore establishment) and Air Force rely almost completely on their Active and Selected Reserve forces to fill M-Day requirements.

If IRRs were substituted for Selected Reservists except where there is a a demonstrable need and capability for peacetime training, costs would be reduced and effectiveness could be increased, as an IRR with recent active duty service is often more skilled (military skills will decay somewhat with time after separation from active service).

IRRs by law are as time-responsive as Selected Reservists, if they are adequately managed. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense directed the Services to assign to the Selected Reserve only those mobilization requirements for which there is a demonstrable need and capability for peacetime training. All Services should expand the use of the IRR to fill mobilization requirements for which recent active duty or Selected Reserve experience is adequate qualification.

Although the IRR is the most important single source of M-Day fillers and replacements for the initial period after M-Day, the Services have in the past given insufficient attention to the management of this resource. Peacetime planning and management of the IRR should be improved. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense directed each Service to identify the IRR manpower required by grade/skill to bring its Active and Reserve

A Naval Reserve member watches a radar screen during a surveillance patrol over the Atlantic Ocean. The Reserve is a vital part of the Total Force.

component force structure to a wartime manning level in the event of a full mobilization, and to replace expected attrition in the most demanding of the planning scenarios.

IRRs needed for Active and Reserve units planned for deployment by M+60 should be preassigned to the units at the time the individuals leave active service. Records for such individuals should be screened regularly to assure accuracy and currency, and the gaining units should be aware of their status.

At the same time that the Army IRR pool is shrinking, the Army's demands on the pool are increasing. By FY 80 the Army will need approximately 100,000 individuals to man units which have no people assigned prior to mobilization. The Army's plans for filling these units need to be reexamined. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense decided that the Army should describe how it plans to fill its unmanned units after mobilization.

The precise time-phased demands that would be placed on the Selective Service System under conditions of full mobilization are uncertain. Standby Reservists would be needed under almost any mobilization scenario. Draftees principally provide a hedge against a war's intense combat phase extending beyond about 90 days, since the first draftees would not complete training until M+150 at the earliest. The analysis of this study leads to the following estimates of the personnel that the Selective Service must provide:

- At least 67,000 Army Standby Reservists within 30-45 days after M-Day. (This is one-half of the enlisted strength of the Standby Reserve; no officers are required from this source.)
- Up to 70,000 Standby Reservists for the other Services by about M+60.
- Up to 300,000 draftees for the Army, depending on actual volunteer levels, by M+180.



Although the other Services show some surpluses in gross manpower terms, they will require Standby Reservists and draftees to meet skill requirements (e.g., prior-service Navy aircraft mechanics, riflemen for the Marine Corps).

In summary, the DoD demand upon Selective Service by M+180 is:

Standby Reservists	137,000
Draftees	390,000
Total	527,000

The Secretary of Defense therefore stated that a standby draft mechanism should be maintained. It should keep the presently planned capability to select Standby Reservists for immediate recall, and to start delivering draftees by M+30, delivering a total of 500,000 people by M+180.

Another important consideration is that some Ready Reservists, both Selected Reservists in units and members of the IRR, are employed in critical civilian occupations. Some of these people are in government, others in critical jobs in civilian industry. It would make no sense to call to active duty an individual who would be of more value to the total war effort in his civilian occupation. There are existing policies which are designed to preclude this dual-slotting, but there are indications that they may not be adequate. At present the number of people in this situation is unknown. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense directed all Services to determine the extent to which Ready Reservists filling key civilian positions constitute an availability problem upon mobilization. Procedures should ensure that these people are transferred temporarily to the

Total Force in the Air Force means involving Guard and Reserve members in this mission. Here, the Air Force moves equipment for the Army during the "Reforger 75" joint training exercise, using C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft.

Standby Reserve, retired, or discharged, as appropriate.

Total Force and the Army

In addition to the changes to the manpower mobilization system described previously, the Secretary of Defense provided new guidance specifically to the Army, based on the Total Force Study review of the Army force structure and organization. The guidance dealt with:

- Adjusting policies and organizations for support of division forces in wartime.
- Increasing antitank capability of the Army, especially in the Reserves, through designing new organizations to provide that capability.
- Managing Reserve units required and planned for early deployment.
- Integrating Active and Reserve forces into a single wartime chain of command, and managing Reserve units in peacetime.
- Accounting for Army division forces.

There has been a major program over the past few years to increase combat capabilities of the active Army within programmed resource levels. The Army's troop list has been carefully reviewed to identify units and manpower spaces that could be converted to combat or essential support units. Aggressive programs driven by pressures from both inside and outside the DoD have led to headquarters and support reductions that will allow the active Army to grow from 13 to 16 divisions without an increase in manpower. The opportunity now exists to apply similar energy to increasing the contribution of the Reserves to overall DoD capability. At the same time support reductions in the active Army will require that additional support for division forces be provided by the

Reserve components.

Three types of actions would allow significant conversions of units to more essential functions:

- Eliminate unneeded support.
- Defer providing some personnel support during the initial combat period.
- Provide more of the wartime medical care in the United States.

Such actions would allow combat units to be increased and deployed earlier than would otherwise have been possible. This means adding some combat units to the Active and Selected Reserve forces, and transferring all unmanned combat units to the Selected Reserve. The additional combat units may be accompanied by additional support units to provide such essential support as intelligence, communications, ammunition, Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), personnel replacements, and maintenance of combat equipment.

As a result of the study, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the Army should do certain things.

First of all, the Army should reduce requirements for U.S. support forces through greater dependence on Allies. Candidate functions for transfer include port operations, transportation, maintenance, and communications.

Secondly, the Army should defer some personnel support during the initial combat period. Candidate functions include food service, routine medical, laundry, and other personnel and administrative services. The Army should also plan on making maximum use of U.S. civilian medical care facilities in wartime.

Next, the Army should adjust the Reserve component structure to reflect the results of the above items. In general, units which do not provide essential services early in a contingency should be considered for elimination or transfer to the unmanned component. Reserve component structure should be identified (or created) to replace essential support forces eliminated under the Nunn Amendment actions, and earmarked for early deployment.

Overall, the Army should identify in its FY 77-81 program total active and/or Reserve reductions of 40,000 structure spaces. Replacement structure may be formed to increase combat capability in Europe early in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conflict. Thus, this action will not result in a reduction of the total force but rather will continue the process of improving combat capability.

A major problem facing U.S. and NATO forces in central Europe is Soviet and Warsaw Pact preponderance in numbers of tanks. A successful defense of central Europe must include provision for destruction of large numbers of Soviet tanks. A unit designed specially for the antitank role offers the promise of meeting the need for increased antitank capability. Such a unit, designed around modern antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), would be ideal for the Reserves—it would be relatively easy for them to train, maintain, and keep ready, and could be deployed by air in C-141 transport aircraft.

The appropriate size for such a unit appears to be a battalion. The battalion (600-800 men) has its own staff and a limited logistics capability, whereas the company (150-200 men) does not. Forming antitank battalions would allow more concentrating of ATGMs, whereas antitank companies might continue the present approach of spreading ATGMs evenly through the force.

The antitank battalion would employ the ATGM in mass in an infantry-supporting role as a member of a combined arms organization. It would extend the capability of the infantry by increasing available supporting fires. Moreover, it would focus on the realities of the threat in Europe, taking maximum advantage of new technology.

Some potential questions with antitank battalions need to be resolved before units are formed:

- Will such units be too specialized in purpose to be useful?
- Would they need to be designed to hold ground, or could they, like tank or artillery units, rely on infantry for defense?
- Are there overriding difficulties in operating battalion-size units?

Testing and development of doctrine and tactics is necessary before a specific decision can be made on formation of antitank battalions.

Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense decided that the Army should include in its FY 77-81 program plans for testing and developing doctrine and tactics for battalions (or other size units as appropriate) designed around infantry antitank guided missiles rather than around riflemen. Testing should begin by FY 77. If the test is successful, Reserve battalions which now have lowest priority for issue of modern equipment and for deployment to Europe should be primary candidates for conversion. Active units may be formed for testing.

Current contingency plans for Europe call for many of the company- and battalion-size Reserve units to deploy by M+60. A comparison was made of the readiness, as of June 1974, of these early-deploying units with that of all Reserve units of comparable size. The results showed that the reported condition of the early deploying units was not significantly better than the average of all units.

There appear to be three principal reasons for this lack of effective discrimination between units needed early and those needed late. First, authorizations for men and equipment tend to be the same for all units, regardless of

their deployment schedule. Second, the readiness reporting system which keeps Army management informed of unit status is not a satisfactory tool for identifying problems and tracking progress. Finally, most of the early-deploying units in the present contingency plan are the less glamorous and less visible support units.

Much attention has properly been given to the readiness of Reserve divisions and brigades to allow them to deploy earlier, but much less attention has been given to the large number of Reserve support units. The affiliation program should lead to further improvements in the readiness of combat battalions and brigades, but will have no effect on most of these early-deploying Reserve units, which the Army counts on to provide timely essential support to Europe and Continental U.S. (CONUS)-based active Army units. This third problem is discussed further in the following section on integration of Active and Reserve forces.

To improve mobilization planning and management for Reserve component units planned for early (M+60) deployment, the Secretary of Defense directed that:

- Reserve units planned for deployment by M+60 should be specifically designated and authorized 100 to 110 percent of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) manpower levels, with an appropriate mix of paid drill and IRRs. This should be accomplished without increasing total paid drill strength over the proposed end FY 76 level of 612,000.
- All men and equipment for wartime should be on hand, or specifically designated for post-M-Day assignment, for the Reserve units planned for deployment prior to M+60.
- A new reporting system should be developed to report the current and projected condition of equipment and manning status,

The Total Force includes all the resources available to perform the various National defense missions. Under certain circumstances, U.S. Allies can be considered a part of the U.S. Total Force structure.

including nonstandard materiel assets that could be deployed, depot stocks, and pre-assigned fillers, as well as programmed changes.

The Army has made major strides toward integration in the past two years with its affiliation program, under which Reserve combat battalions and brigades are affiliated with Active divisions. Through this relationship, peacetime training of the Reserve units is improved, enabling quicker deployment in a major contingency. At the same time the utility of the Active division base is maximized, as the division controls and supports a larger organization.

The affiliation program has provided major benefits to date. However, two problems still remain. First, it does not provide for integration of about three-quarters of the Reserve combat battalions, including all Reserve divisions. Secondly, and more important, it does not integrate any of the nondivisional support units, which make up half of the Reserve strength, into the wartime command chain.

The major problem with the present system is that it requires a complete reorganization during the most critical and hectic period—right after mobilization. At this time the Army will convert from its peacetime organization to its wartime organization. All the support units will be assigned to corps, corps support commands, or theater Army support commands, generally through some intermediate headquarters. An alternative organization would use the wartime chain of command in peacetime. The teams would be formed before M-Day, and the same chain of command would control Active, Guard, and Reserve units. As much as possibly of the "Peacetime-Only" command structure would be eliminated. However, the role of the Governors and Adjutants General in commanding the Guard units would be preserved. All units would be preassigned to their M-Day gaining command, much as the Air Reserve Forces are preassigned at the present time. Such an organization should be able to deploy and operate effectively faster than can the present organization.

The wartime chain of command concept probably would be used if an Army were designed from scratch However, a reorganization of the current Army's total force could be turbulent and disruptive if it were implemented suddenly. The Army has recently reorganized extensively, with new units and headquarters formed for training and administration of the Reserves. Eliminating these organizations suddenly would be traumatic. Moreover, there are numerous problems of geographic and functional dispersion that would have to be solved in establishing a workable pre-assignment chain of command. In this instance, there could even be some increase needed in headquarters to plan and manage the conversion to wartime operation. This may appear to be a reversal of the drive to reduce headquarters—however, the task is a critical one. Corps integration should now be considered a goal, and progress toward it made in an evolutionary manner. The first step toward this goal should be examining, in detail, the concept for integrating the Reserve units which would be deployed by M+60.

Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to examine integration of Active and Reserve forces beyond the current affiliation program. Specifically, the Army should develop and evaluate a conceptual plan to use the wartime chain of command for supervising peacetime training, readiness, and operational planning

for all Active and Reserve units, including combat, combat support, and combat service support, planned for deployment by M+60. In doing so, consideration should be given to the preassignment of Active and Reserve units to corps or theater Army support commands, through appropriate intermediate headquarters. The Army's evaluation should consider the effects of such a change on Reserve readiness, ability to provide effective combat support and combat service support of combat units in Europe through M+60, organizational turbulence, costs, and any other important aspects.

Total Force and the Navy

The Total Force Policy has had less influence on the Navy than on the other Services. The Naval Reserve Force is more nearly a distinct and separate entity than are the Reserve components of the Army or the Air Force. To some extent, this is a logical outgrowth of the Navy's higher peacetime operating tempo and forward deployments. The position of the United States as the outstanding maritime power argues for a continuation, or even expansion of these practices. This is especially true in an era when this Nation is forced to reduce reliance on overseas bases; when overflight rights become a problem; and when its ability to stage through Allied territory is uncertain. Accordingly, the Navy, as compared to the other Services, must have the largest portion of its total force in the Active establishment.

While families are taken to Germany or Japan, they are not taken to sea. As a result, the Navy has more of its people separated from their families than does the Army or Air Force. The following table shows unaccompanied overseas deployments of the four military Services at the end of FY 74.

Unaccompanied Overseas Deployments, End FY 74

(Military Manpower (000)

	TOTAL	DEPLOYED UNACCOMPANIED No.	Per Cent
Army	780	55	7
Navy	546	85*	16
Air Force	644	34	5
Marine Corps	189	35	19

* Includes an average of 39,000 at sea from CONUS assignment.

An overseas assignment in which one is accompanied by dependents has less adverse impact on morale than does an unaccompanied tour. While a soldier or an airman on the average can expect to be away from home about one year in twenty, a sailor can look forward to an average of one year in six away from home. Even this, however, does not reflect the true extent of the problem. Some spend as much as one year in four away from home.

The amount of time a sailor spends on unaccompanied deployments is an indication of the lesser percentage of tasks within the Navy establishment that can potentially be filled by nonmobilized Reservists. With a greater proportion of its



Success of the Total Force policy depends on the effectiveness of all the units involved. This Force includes Naval aircraft such as the E-1B (left), Air Force Reserve nurses (center), Navy's P-3 aircraft (top right) and amphibious transport ships (bottom right).

manpower involved in unaccompanied peacetime deployment situations, and with the requirement that it deployed forces be immediately combat ready, the Navy presents less opportunity for the employment of Reservists than the Army or Air Force.

The Secretary of Defense provided new guidance specifically to the Navy, based on the Total Force Study. This guidance dealt with:

- The use of Reserve manpower, and the opportunity for increasing effectiveness and reducing cost through expanded use of IRRs.
- Testing different Active/Reserve manpower mixes on surface combatant ships.
- Expanding the carrier training of the Naval Air Reserve, and testing its capability to meet the readiness requirements of the carrier tactical air mission.

The Navy is the only Service which uses Selected Reservists as individual augmentees for the Active force. Of the 92,000 Navy Selected Reservists, 63,000 are assigned to augment the Active force—44,000 of these would augment the shore establishment. In contrast, both the Army and Marine Corps plan on assigning IRRs as fillers, while the Air Force plans to bring its force structure to wartime strength by drawing down the peacetime support establishment.

All augmentees for active ships are Selected Reservists, organized into ship reinforcement units (SRUs). With the exception of some SRUs assigned to the Pacific Fleet, they have been assigned to a class of ship rather than to a specific ship, and have not normally trained on that specific type ship. Some SRUs are located close to Naval bases, for example, two submarine tender SRUs are at San Diego, California and one is at Charleston, South Carolina. On the other hand, many are far removed from any ship. Examples are submarine tender SRUs in Pocatello, Idaho and Birmingham, Alabama, repair ship SRTs in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and Phoenix, Arizona, and destroyer SRUs in Denver, Colorado, and Waterloo, Iowa.

An alternative system would fill some augmentation billets with IRRs, preassigned at the time the individuals leave Active Service. The time-responsiveness of the IRR should be the same as that of the Selected Reservist—both are treated the same (as Ready Reservists) in the laws defining call up authority. If the IRR's mobilization billet were similar to the active billet he had recently left, he should be well trained and current—more so than a Selected Reservist paid for drilling on inadequate or non-existent equipment in a place far from a ship he rarely, if ever, sees. It is recognized that not all augmentation billets can be filled by IRRs since they are generally junior in pay grade (0-3, E-4, and below) and do not normally maintain or improve their military skills.

Aside from the potential increase in effectiveness, there is a considerable cost benefit in substituting an IRR for a Selected Reservist. Figure 2 showed that an IRR costs from zero to $1,600 per year, depending on his participation in summer training, while a Selected Reservist in pay category A (48 paid drills plus two weeks of summer training) costs $3,400. Ninety percent of Navy Selected Reservists are in pay category A. Thus, there is a potential saving of over $3,000/yr in substituting an IRR for a Selected Reservist.

Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to expand the use of IRRs, through his direction that all Services should assign to the Selected Reserve only those mobilization requirements for which there is a demonstrable need and capability for peacetime training. The Navy should expand the use of the IRR to fill mobilization requirements for which recent active duty or Selected Reserve experience is adequate qualification.

Over the next five years, the Navy plans to increase the level of active manning on most of its first line combatant ships to the level required for wartime operations. The Navy has found that for most ships it takes about as many people in peacetime as in wartime to maintain materiel condition and to train effectively. The wartime manning level is based on industrial engineering/work measurement techniques, and is recorded in the Navy's ship manning documents.

While the Active combatants are programmed to be manned at wartime strength, the Reserve surface combatants will average about 65 percent active manning, with 35 percent of their wartime strength made up of Selected Reservists. It is unclear how much of the wartime manning of these Reserve ships can be assigned to Reservists, with the ships still kept in a high enough state of readiness to meet contingency requirements. The Navy in the past has manned some of the less complicated World War I escorts with 80 percent Reservists and 20 percent active duty people, but their performance was uneven, and the results were not conclusive. Testing is needed to determine the feasibility of decreasing the Active/Reserve ratio on the Reserve ships.

Therefore, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the Navy complete a test in FY 77 of the three planned manning systems for surface combatants, comparing 80 percent Active/20 percent Reserve and 65 percent Active/35 percent Reserve with 100 percent Active manning, using ships of comparable age. In addition, the Navy should test, on two Reserve surface combatants, the feasibility of reducing peacetime operating

The Air Force delivers an Army helicopter to its destination via a C-5 Galaxy. Air Force Reserves are integrated into the single command structure and operate the most modern equipment, such as this C-5.

tempo and reducing peacetime manning to 35 percent Active/65 percent Reserve. The tests should allow comparative evaluation of all four manning systems.

In FY 76 the Navy will maintain 13 carriers and 13 Active air wings, dropping to 12 Active air wings in FY 77. At that time the 13th carrier is to be maintained in a special category—it would not be equipped to handle the more sophisticated aircraft, it would not have a dedicated air wing or support ships, and it would not be deployed overseas on a routine basis. Instead, the ship would be available to improve the readiness of Reserve aircraft squadrons and to deploy in an emergency with either Active Marines or Navy Reserve squadrons embarked.

Reserve wings have never been associated with any specific carrier, and their mobilization mission has never been clear. Navy plans simply called for using the Reserves as the situation warrants, emphasizing maximum flexibility. The most likely mission in the past would have been to supply attrition replacement aircraft (and possibly air crews) to Active squadrons. With the retention of the 13th carrier with no dedicated Active wing, it may now be possible to expand the role of the Naval Reserve in the carrier .. tactical air mission.

However, there are some unresolved questions involving the capability of the Naval Reserve to mobilize and deploy as rapidly as they would be needed. Answering these questions will require testing. Answering them positively will, at a minimum, require determination on the part of the Active Navy to make the Reserves a truly useful part of the total carrier tactical air force—to demand more of the Reserves, to provide them with more resources, and to integrate the Active and Reserve forces into a total force. It will also require a willingness on the part of the Reserves to assess their strengths and weaknesses realistically, and to take whatever corrective steps are necessary.

Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to:

- Provide for the two Reserve air wings to spend their active duty training on board a carrier, scheduled so that one wing is

always carrier-qualified.

- By the end of FY 77, complete a test of the feasibility of maintaining Reserve wings at a level of training proficiency such that one wing could be mobilized and deployed on a carrier, ready for combat (including night and cyclic operations) within 14 days; and the second wing similarly ready within 30 days.
- If the test leads to the conclusion that the Reserves cannot meet the time requirements, the Navy should disband the Reserve tactical air carrier squadrons in FY 78.

Total Force And the Air Force

Total Force policy is closer to reality in the Air Force than in any other Service. The Air Force has integrated Active and Reserve forces through the gaining command concept, preassigning Air Reserve forces in peacetime to the organizations with which they will serve during wartime. The Air Reserve forces have high states of readiness, with two-thirds of the force considered deployable within 10 days after mobilization, and some units deployable within three days. About one-third of the tactical fighter forces are in the Reserves, along with two-thirds of the tactical airlift capability. In FY 76, for the first time, Reserves will participate in the strategic offensive mission as they receive KC-135 tanker aircraft. The Reserves provide significant additional strategic airlift capability through associate units which routinely supply crew members to fly Military Airlift Command (MAC) C-5s and C-141s. Even without mobilization, Reserve crew members have played a significant role. For example, during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, one or more Reserve crew members participated in about 25 percent of world wide strategic airlift missions.

The Air Force has an extensive program underway to modernize the Reserves' aircraft inventory. Since 1966, the Air Force has eliminated 14 outmoded aircraft types from the Reserves. As these older aircraft phased out the Reserve units were equipped with modern aircraft, such as F-4s, RF-4s, and A-7s. The KC-135 is now moving into the Reserves, replacing the KC-97, and the Air Force plans to buy new A-10s directly for the Reserves. Over the FY 70-80 period, the Air Force plans to replace 82 percent of the Reserve inventory with modern aircraft. The remaining 18 percent are the 0-2 Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft and the C-7/C-123 short-takeoff/landing (STOL) transports.

The 0-2s are also found in the Active force. In a sophisticated air defense environment they will have limited utility, as will the OV-10, the other FAC aircraft in the Active inventory. Because the airborne FAC mission is a vital factor in the way the Air Force provides close air support to the ground forces, the development of a more survivable FAC aircraft is expected. When available, it should replace the 0-2s and OV-10s in both the Active and Reserve components.

The STOL aircraft have very limited range and payload capability. Under current plans they would be replaced as the Advanced Medium STOL (AMST) enters the force in the 1980's.

Air Reserve forces are ready to deploy earlier, are more thoroughly integrated into a single command structure, and operate equipment that is more modern than the Army or Navy Reserve components. The remaining modernization problems, the 0-2 and old STOLs, appear to require several years to solve. Therefore, there were no recommendations for new Air Force program guidance.

Total Force Trends

The FY 76 budget program and the guidance provided for FY 77-81 should accelerate the following trends in the role of the Reserves in the Total Force.

- Improved modernization of Reserve forces, providing them with equipment that is more capable and more compatible with Active force equipment.
- Better management of Reserve forces and their key supporting programs such as the Individual Ready Reserve, providing greater capability for the money spent.
- Increased recognition that useful Reserves are essential, but non-essential or ineffective Reserves are an unaffordable luxury. Reserve units and individuals not required in the force structure should either be converted to higher priority missions or eliminated.
- Increased integration of Active and Reserve forces, thus simplifying the transition from normal peacetime operation to operation of a single force after mobilization.

These trends taken together will allow continued increase in the Nation's reliance on the Reserve forces in a major war, and a greater Reserve contribution after mobilization than has ever been achieved.

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
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